We develop a formal model of asset prices in which investors are subject to confirmation bias, which describes the tendency of individuals to search for and interpret information selectively to conform to a given set of beliefs. The model produces three notable results. First, the model generates price patterns which validate certain well-documented trading strategies, in particular the "head-and-shoulders" pattern. Second, asset prices exhibit negative autocorrelations over very short horizons, positive autocorrelations over intermediate horizons, and negative autocorrelations over long horizons, which matches the observed stylized properties of U.S. equity prices. Third, the model predicts that sequential price jumps for a particular stock will be positively autocorrelated. Several recent econometric papers have shown that one can identify significant jumps by comparing realized volatility and bi-power return variation. Using this methodology, together with tick-by-tick data on all stocks in the S&P 100 index from 1999-2005, we identify and calculate significant jumps in stock prices. Consistent with the predictions of the model, we find that jumps exhibit statistically and economically significant positive autocorrelations.
1.

Introduction
Technical analysts use information about historical movements in price and trading volume, summarized in the form of charts, to forecast future price trends in a variety of financial markets. The claims of technical analysts were initially discounted by the academic community on the grounds that they were inconsistent with market efficiency. But recent work has called into question the extent to which markets are fully efficient. There is now convincing evidence that stock prices display short-term momentum over periods of six months to a year and longerterm mean reversion (De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; Chopra, Lakonishok and Ritter, 1992; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) . This provides support for a particular class of technical trading rule that is designed to detect persistent trends. Such rules have been shown to perform profitably in foreign exchange markets (Dooley and Shafer, 1983; Sweeney, 1986; Levich and Thomas, 1993; Neely, Weller and Dittmar, 1997) . There is also evidence of economically significant price reversals over short time horizons of a week to a month (Jegadeesh, 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995; Lehmann, 1990; Gutierrez and Kelley, 2007) . 1 Various theoretical arguments have been advanced to explain the observed patterns of momentum and reversal (see e.g. Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny, 1998; Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam, 1998, Hong and Stein, 1999) . These models introduce various departures from fully rational behavior, and imply that investors using trading rules of the trend-following variety may be able to profit from these departures from rationality.
The use of technical signals based on price patterns has received less academic attention, despite the fact that these signals are widely used by practitioners. Chang and Osler (1999) examine the profitability of using the "head-and-shoulders" pattern in the foreign exchange market to predict changes of trend, and find evidence of excess returns for some currencies but not others. Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) develop a pattern detection algorithm based on kernel regression. They apply this methodology to identify a variety of technical price patterns including "head-and-shoulders" in the U.S. stock market over the period 1962 -1996 . They find statistical evidence that there is potentially useful information contained in most of the patterns they consider. Savin, Weller and Zvingelis (2007) show that a modified version of the algorithm of Lo, Mamaysky and Wang applied to the "head-and-shoulders" pattern has substantial predictive power for U.S. stock returns over periods of one to three months.
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework that can account for the apparent success of both trend-following and pattern-based technical trading rules. We introduce a single cognitive bias into the model, that of confirmation bias. The bias is a phenomenon that has been extensively documented in experimental studies. It refers to the search for, or the interpretation of evidence in ways that favor existing beliefs or expectations. It has been described as "perhaps the best known and most widely accepted notion of inferential error to come out of the literature on human reasoning." (Evans, 1989 , p.41 quoted in Nickerson, 1998 .
A related phenomenon has been extensively investigated in the management literature under the heading of "escalation of commitment." This research seeks to provide explanations for commitment within organizations to losing courses of action. Theoretical explanations often focus on the theory of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) . It is argued that people who are responsible for poor decisions seek to rationalize them by biasing their interpretation of information relevant for assessing the outcome of the decisions. A study of the banking industry found that bank executive turnover predicted both provisions for loan losses and the write-off of bad loans (Staw, Barsade and Koput, 1997) . The implication of these findings is that those individuals responsible for making the original loan decisions exhibited systematic bias in their interpretation of information about the status of the loans.
A specific example of how confirmation bias is recognized as a potential source of inefficiency within the investment community is provided by Camerer and Loewenstein (2004, p.17) . They report how an investment banker had described the way in which his firm combated the effects of traders' "emotional attachment to their past trades" by periodically forcing traders to switch positions with each other. In a study looking at dissonance effects in the context of mutual fund investment, Goetzmann and Peles (1997) found that even well-informed investors had a tendency to favorably distort their perceptions of the past performance of funds that they held. This may explain the observed asymmetry between investment flows into winning funds and out of losing funds (Ippolito, 1992) .
Confirmation bias has also been shown to manifest itself in group decision making (Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens and Moscovici, 2000) . Using a sample of middle managers from banks and industrial companies, the experiment involved analysis of a case study in which a company has to decide whether or not to proceed with a large investment. Subjects were required to come to a preliminary conclusion individually before being combined into groups. At this point they were given access to additional information. Groups that agreed in their preliminary conclusions showed a strong preference for accessing supporting rather than conflicting information. This finding is of particular interest in the present context, since many portfolio investment decisions are the outcome of group deliberations.
In our model, information arrival is modeled with signals of various magnitudes, arriving at differing frequencies. Large, infrequently observed signals are interpreted rationally by investors. However, investors' interpretation of less informative signals (which arrive more frequently) is biased by the recently observed large signals. The model generates price patterns, most notably the "head-and-shoulders" pattern, which have the predictive power for future stock returns claimed by technical analysts. The model thus provides a theoretical foundation for several price patterns commonly used by technical analysts. The model also produces the welldocumented pattern of price momentum which can be exploited by trend-following technical rules such as those based on the comparison of short-and long-run moving averages.
In addition, our model makes several predictions. First, return autocorrelations are negative over very short horizons, positive over intermediate horizons, and become negative again over long horizons. This feature of the model conforms to the empirical properties of U.S. equity prices described above. Our model also produces a sharp prediction that the time series of jumps in the price series should be positively autocorrelated. To our knowledge, this is a new and untested empirical prediction.
We provide empirical evidence that confirms the prediction of our model that sequential price jumps in equity prices are positively autocorrelated. Specifically, we utilize the statistical bi-power variation estimation technique to identify all statistically significant jumps in the price series of the individual component stocks of the S&P 100 Index over the sample period 1999-2005. We find that sequential price jumps exhibit statistically and economically significant positive autocorrelations, and that these autocorrelations decay at a rate that is also consistent with the model. Our model and empirical tests complement the recent empirical work of Gutierrez and Kelley (2007) . They document negative weekly autocorrelations immediately after extreme information events, but find that momentum profits emerge several weeks after an extreme return and persist over the remainder of the year. Moreover, this momentum easily offsets the brief and initial return reversal. Our model produces predictions consistent with this finding. They also find that markets react similarly to explicit (public) and implicit (private) news, and note that many behavioral models require investors to react differently to different types of news. In contrast, our model makes no distinction between public and private news.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present the model. Section 4 describes various trading rules and relates them to the model. In Section 5 we describe our jump detection methodology, and in Section 6 present empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
The model with a single low-frequency signal
The process by which information is revealed and incorporated into prices is constructed to capture the important features of a jump-diffusion process in a discrete-time framework. The jump-diffusion model of stock returns has a long history (Merton, 1976) and recent work by Barndorff-Neilsen and Shephard (2004) indicates that jumps in equity prices contribute a significant proportion of total price volatility. Research on empirical option pricing has also found that introducing jump components into the underlying price series alleviates some of the pricing biases found in standard models (Bates, 2003) . We suppose that there are low-frequency signals that are more informative than high-frequency signals. One can think of the lowfrequency signals as generating the jumps in the price series, and the high-frequency signals as generating the diffusion. There is a single representative investor who is assumed to be risk neutral, and who observes a low-frequency signal (L-signal) at date 0 about the liquidation value of a security. At subsequent dates, a sequence of high-frequency signals (H-signals) is observed.
At date T, all information about security value is revealed and the investor receives its liquidation value.
Model Specification
The risky security has a liquidation value θ = T V , which has a prior which is normally distributed with mean zero and variance . The signal at date 0 is
where . The initial price of the asset (before the L-signal is observed) is determined by the prior mean of θ, which is zero. Given risk neutrality, the price at date 0 is given by the expectation of We assume that the perceived signal takes the form 
The properties of are: 
, t = 1;
The property P4 of the function ( ) t m is a straightforward normalization. P5 and P6 are intended to capture the fact that confirmation bias does not persist indefinitely, but diminishes over time, and eventually disappears.
A sufficient statistic for a given sequence of objective H-signals is given by the average
A sufficient statistic for a given sequence of perceived H-signals is given by the average
Since the bias in the perception of the public signals amounts to an additive shift in the mean, the perceived variances are not affected and are equal to the true values.
From now on it is more convenient to work with precisions rather than variances, and we introduce the following notation: 
Note that the weights here are the rational Bayesian weights. Bias arises only because .
This contrasts with the approach taken in behavioral models based on overconfidence, where signal precision is incorrectly perceived. The rational price is given by , t = 1, 2, …
Proof: See Appendix A.
The inequalities in (a) and (b) indicate that price always overreacts to the private Lsignal, though not immediately. Since we have normalized the initial price to zero, represents a (rational) positive price response generated by a favorable signal . This is followed by subsequent prices that are greater than the fully rational price. If the signal is unfavorable, the reverse is true. Part (c) implies that the extent of the overreaction at some point starts to decline and that the asset price eventually converges to the rational price.
Overreaction and Autocorrelations
Next we consider the evolution of price overreaction over time conditional on the realization of the L-signal: 
We evaluate the autocorrelation function in the following case:
The result is plotted in Figure 2 and shows a pattern of positive autocorrelations at short horizons followed by negative autocorrelations at longer horizons. It is therefore consistent with the empirical evidence documenting short-horizon momentum and long-horizon reversal.
The results derived from the model of this section are qualitatively the same as those obtained by Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) (henceforth DHS) from the multiperiod version of their model in which they introduce overconfidence and biased selfattribution. It is also true that confirmation bias has been identified as a source of overconfidence. But the way in which we model the effects of the bias is distinct from that followed by DHS. They show that biased self-attribution can generate time-varying overconfidence with respect to a private signal, and assume that public signals are correctly interpreted. But as we noted above, Gutierrez and Kelley (2007) 
A model with low, medium and high-frequency signals
We extend the model by introducing a second source of uncertainty affecting the value of the security. This additional source of uncertainty is assumed to be associated with signals which occur at an intermediate frequency.
The Model with M-Signals
We assume that the liquidation value of the security is given by 
The bias function is assumed to have the same multiplicatively separable form.
The dependence on λ σ scales the mean shift in the perceived signal, and results in a smaller bias for signals about less variable i.e. less informative components of fundamentals.
Each M-signal is followed by its own sequence of H-signals providing information about the same component of the terminal value of the asset. Thus
We suppose for simplicity that these H-signals are not subject to the effects of confirmation bias.
2 Just as in the analysis of the previous section, we can represent the information contained in the public messages as
We denote the precision of the variables i λ , i η and
Then the asset price is given by
The i-th component in the summation becomes non-zero at t i , the time at which the associated M- 
There are now two components of the observed price which lead it to diverge from its rational value. The first, as before, arises because . H-signals about The unconditional autocorrelations are plotted in Figure 3 . We see that in contrast to the plot in Figure 2 , at very short horizons the return autocorrelations are negative. The pattern is one of reversal followed by continuation and then again reversal. This matches the pattern of autocorrelations documented in a number of studies (Jegadeesh, 1990; Lehmann, 1990; Lo and MacKinlay 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1995; Gutierrez and Kelley, 2007) .
Further Explanation of Autocorrelation Patterns
In the model with L-signals and H-signals only, we observe a pattern of autocorrelations that are positive at short lags and then become negative at longer lags. However, when M-signals are introduced, very short lag autocorrelations are negative, become positive at intermediate lags and then again turn negative at long lags. To help understand the sources of these autocorrelation patterns, note that whenever there is a shock to an asset price that moves it away from fundamental value, this will induce negative autocorrelation at a horizon that is dependent on the speed with which the deviation is corrected.
In the model with L-signals and H-signals only, the more informative L-signal induces a drift away from fundamental value when the first H-signal is realized. This deviation from fundamental value is corrected only relatively slowly as the effects of confirmation bias dissipate. The move away from fundamental value generated by the effects of the bias causes the initial phase of positive autocorrelation. Price correction occurs relatively slowly, producing negative autocorrelations at long horizons.
M-signals convey additional fundamental information, but are interpreted in a biased manner, which results in a deviation from fundamental value. But learning about the fundamental underlying the M-signals is more rapid and at short horizons it generates a negative autocorrelation that outweighs the positive autocorrelations induced by the L-signals.
In effect, the model overlays two patterns of overreaction and reversal, one over a relatively long horizon (related to the L-signal and its own H-signals) and the other over a much shorter horizon (related to each M-signal and its associated H-signals). The parameterization of the model is such that we get the initial inverted-U shape to the autocorrelation function.
Clearly, the autocorrelations are dependent on the particular parameter values chosen, but they [ ]
[ ] 1. The "head" should be significantly taller than the "shoulders".
2. The top and bottom of the shoulders should be of roughly equal height.
3. The overall pattern should be fairly symmetric i.e. the spacing between left shoulder and head should be approximately the same as that between head and right shoulder.
The "neckline" in the figure is a straight line connecting the troughs between the two shoulders and the head. It is used to determine the point at which a trade is initiated, which is where the neckline intersects the price series after the right shoulder. The pattern signals an imminent price decline, so the technical analyst executes a short sale. The "inverse head-and-shoulders" pattern is simply the pattern in Figure 4 viewed upside down. In this case the pattern predicts a rise in price, and the technical analyst buys the stock.
The "double top" pattern is illustrated in Figure 5 . Here the pattern is identified by the appearance of two local maxima of approximately equal value. As with head-and-shoulders, the pattern is interpreted as a signal of future price decline. The "double bottom" is an inverted double top, and signals a future rise in price.
There are several studies which provide evidence that price patterns contain information that may be relevant for predicting future prices. Lo, Mamaysky and Wang (2000) , henceforth LMW, develop an algorithm for identifying a number of patterns including the four described above. They find that the distribution of prices conditional on a pattern occurrence is significantly different from the unconditional distribution. Savin, Weller and Zvingelis (2007) use a modified version of the LMW algorithm to show that the head-and-shoulders pattern has significant predictive power for future stock returns over horizons of one to three months. 
or equivalently,
We represent a "typical" price pattern by examining the expected path of prices conditional on an initial L-signal. We use the same parameter values as for the autocorrelation plot in Figure 3 , and choose . However, we assume that the timing of M-signals is fixed and deterministic. The same pattern characteristics will be recognizable in distinct price paths even with random variation in signal timing, but if we were to average over these separate paths this would tend to obscure the features of the pattern. Figure 6 shows a graph of the expected path of prices conditional on L . The head-andshoulders pattern emerges clearly. All three identifying features of the pattern listed above are reproduced. In addition, it is clear that the model confirms the predictive content of the pattern and is consistent with the findings in Savin, Weller and Zvingelis (2007) . The pattern appears as the momentum phase terminates and is followed by reversal. Some technical analysts specify also that if the pattern is to be a reliable guide to trading it should occur after a period of significant price increase. This characteristic is also consistent with the path shown in Figure 6 .
If the price path is calculated conditional on
, with all other parameters given the same values, then we obtain the result illustrated in Figure 7 . This pattern satisfies all the requirements for the inverted head-and-shoulders price pattern. It is a predictor of future price appreciation.
Experimentation reveals that both the head-and-shoulders and the inverted head-andshoulders patterns are surprisingly robust, in that they will appear for different parameter values, different intervals between signals, and are also not sensitive to changes in the speed of decay captured by the function . This accords with the claims of technical analysts that these particular patterns are among the most reliable. 
Jump Detection Methodology
We now turn to examining the model's prediction that sequential price jumps for a particular stock will be positively autocorrelated. Recently, researchers have developed econometric techniques that can effectively separate the continuous and jump components of the underlying price process by utilizing high-frequency trade-by-trade data (Anderson, Bollerslev and Diebold (2007) , Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) , Tauchen and Zhou (2006) ). These researchers effectively demonstrate that the difference between realized volatility (RV), which approximates the total daily return variance, and bi-power variation (BV), which estimates the variance due to the continuous return component, is a consistent estimator of the return variance due to the jump return component. Jumps occur when the statistic (RV -BV) is significantly different from zero, and we assume that at most one jump occurs per day. Appendix C includes a technical description of the jump detection methodology, including the asymptotic distribution of the (RV -BV) measure.
Data Description
To test the predictions of the model, we are interested in obtaining a reasonably large cross-section of firms. At the same time, the data-intensity of high-frequency trade data creates practical limits on the number of firms in our sample. To balance these issues, we use the sample construction methodology of Dunham and Friesen (2007) went public during the sample period and for these firms we use data from the IPO date through the end of the sample period.
We use the bid-ask midpoint for each transaction to mitigate bid-ask bounce, and also apply several filters to eliminate erroneous observations. First, the offer/bid ratio must be less than 1.10 for the quote to be included. 4 Second, we apply a sandwich filter to eliminate quotes that are 10% or further in absolute value from surrounding quotes on both sides. This filter eliminates the following erroneous type of quote sequence: a first quote that is immediately followed by a significantly higher (or lower) second quote that is subsequently followed by a third quote which is consistent with the first quote in the sequence. 5 Visual inspection reveals numerous instances of such spurious quotes "sandwiched" between two otherwise consistent quotes, and our filter eliminates the erroneous quote. Without this filter, our estimation model might incorrectly identify a significant jump when prices jump to the erroneous quote and then jump back to the correct price.
We only include quotes during regular trading hours, segment each trading day into fiveminute intervals and calculate interval returns using the bid-offer midpoint. For the first trading interval of each day, we utilize the opening daily bid-offer midpoint and calculate the first interval return using the bid-offer midpoint calculated at the end of the first interval. 6 We control for stock splits by eliminating any daily interval with a five-minute return greater than 50%. 4 For example, on 4/07/00 American Airlines (ticker: AA) has a TAQ record consisting of a bid quote of $68.125 and an offer quote of $80. All other bid-offer spreads for the day were much narrower, typically less than $0.25, and thus our filter eliminated this bid and offer quote. We also found occurrences in the TAQ quote data where a quotation appeared to be a typographical error or seemed inconsistent with surrounding quotes. For example, a bid quote of $23.375 for HCA on 8/17/00 is followed by a quote of $33.375, and surrounded by bid quotes of $33 or greater throughout the trading day.
5 For example, a sequence of 3 midpoint quotes for American Airlines (ticker: AA) on 12/07/2000 are as follows; $31.03 for interval 1, $84.91 for interval 2, and $30.66 for interval 3. An examination of all other quotes for AA on 12/07/2000 suggested that the $84.91 quote for interval 2 was invalid. 6 In the previous empirical work we examined, we found that most studies calculated the first interval return by using the closing midpoint quote from the previous trading day or just omitted the first interval from the daily jump calculation to prevent overnight factors from influencing the first interval return.
In short, our data set includes all of the component stocks of the S&P 100 Index as of 
Empirical Results
We first report cross-sectional summary statistics on realized volatility and bi-power variation in Table 1 for all 99 component firms in the S&P 100 Index over the sample period.
The ratio of bi-power variation to realized volatility (BV/RV), or the square root of this ratio, which can be interpreted as a standard deviation measure, has been used elsewhere in the literature to measure the fraction of total volatility generated by the continuous return component (Tauchen and Zhou (2006) Panel (b) of Table 1 reports that jumps contribute between 5% and 10% of the total variance in the average firm, measured as the ratio of jump risk to total risk.
In Table 2 , we report distributional statistics for the cross-section of equity jumps for all 99 firms in the sample, conditional upon a jump occurring. To do this, we first calculate the average value for each statistic separately for each firm in the sample. Table 2 reports the mean, median, minimum and maximum values of the firm-level averages. Panel (a) of Table 2 reports jump frequency among other measures for all jumps, measured as the number of days with a jump divided by the total number of days in the sample, and shows that the average firm in the sample experiences a daily jump approximately twelve percent of the time, or about every eight trading days. We also report an absolute jump size to provide an indication of the magnitude of jumps when they occur. Panel (a) of Table 2 reports a mean (median) absolute jump size 1.39%
(1.36%). To shed light on the meaningfulness of this statistic, we report summary statistics on the absolute daily return in the third row of Panel (a). The ratio of absolute jump size to absolute daily return implies that on days when jumps occur, the jump component represents nearly 90%
of the total return, on average. Lastly, Panel (a) of Table 2 also reports jump variance and total variance. The ratio of jump variance to total variance, which is analogous to the ratio (BV/RV) described above, shows that jumps contribute nearly 60% of total risk for individual stocks (0.000275 / 0.000465). Table 2 reports the same statistics as Panel (a), except that Panel (b) uses only equity jumps that occur on high realized volatility days, which we define as days where an individual stock's realized volatility is above its median realized volatility calculated over the entire sample period. As might be expected on higher volatility days, the mean (median) absolute jump size substantially increases to 1.91% (1.88%) but the jump frequency remains stable at around 12%. While the percentage of total risk attributable to jumps is marginally higher at 62% in Panel (b), the small difference suggests that the jump contribution to total risk is fairly robust to whether or not days of low volatility are included or excluded.
Panel (b) of
We next examine the nature of the autocorrelation between sequential equity jumps.
Proposition 2 indicates that sequential price jumps will be positively autocorrelated. We start by examining correlations between sequential equity jumps at time t, t+1, t+2 and t+3 in Panel (a) of Table 3 . Using only those trading days on which a jump occurs, we find an average autocorrelation of nearly 0.04 between sequential price jumps. The autocorrelations between a jump at time t and its subsequent three jumps are all positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 8 To provide further insight, we also examine the autocorrelations on days of high realized volatility as defined above in Panel (b) of Table 2 we use only the largest decile of absolute jumps. Conditioning on L-frequency jumps in this manner, we find that the correlations are two to three times larger than those reported in Table 3 .
In particular, the lag-1 correlation is 0.0603 in panel (b) and 0.0919 in panel (c), and both correlations are statistically significant at the 0.999 level.
While these correlations are small in absolute value, the size of the observed correlation in jumps depends upon the magnitude of the underlying investor bias. Few studies have explicitly quantified the magnitude of the confirmation bias in individuals, although Friesen and Weller (2006) measure the magnitude of the closely related cognitive dissonance bias in financial analyst forecasts. They find that while the cognitive dissonance bias is present, it is relatively small in magnitude. Specifically, their estimates suggest that cognitive dissonance introduces a mean-shift bias into analyst forecasts of between 5% and 10% of the lagged forecast error. In light of their finding, the correlations of 0.06 and 0.092 reported in Panels (b) and (c) of Table 4 do not seem unreasonable.
Conclusion
This paper develops a theoretical framework that can account for the apparent success of both trend-following and pattern-based technical trading rules. Our model introduces a single cognitive bias, which has been extensively documented in the psychological literature and describes the tendency of individuals to search for and interpret information selectively to conform to a given set of beliefs.
In that that conform to a number of well-documented trading strategies.
In addition, our model makes two empirically testable predictions. First, return autocorrelations are negative over very short horizons, positive over intermediate horizons, and become negative again over long horizons. This feature of the model conforms to the welldocumented empirical properties of U.S. equity prices. Our model also predicts that the time series of jumps in the price series should be positively autocorrelated. We provide empirical evidence that confirms the prediction of our model that the sequential price jumps in equity prices are positively autocorrelated. Specifically, we utilized the bi-power variation estimation technique described in Tauchen and Zhou (2006) to identify all statistically significant equity jumps on the individual component stocks of the S&P 100 Index over the sample period 1999-2005. We find that sequential equity jumps exhibit statistically and economically significant positive autocorrelations.
Our model and empirical tests complement the recent empirical work of Gutierrez and Kelley (2007) , who document negative weekly autocorrelations immediately after extreme information events, but find that momentum profits emerge several weeks after an extreme return and persist over the remainder of the year. This finding is consistent with the predictions of our model. Also consistent with our model, they find that markets react similarly to explicit (public) and implicit (private) news.
Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
We may demonstrate the proposition by first observing that
. Given properties P1 and P2, always has the same sign as . Since , it follows that has the same sign as . This proves (a) and (b).
The fact that
follows from observing that implies that must be bounded. Therefore
. This proves (c).
Autocorrelations in the many-period model
The asset price is described by the following expression:
We define the following variables: 
We then obtain 9 All expectations are conditional on the instant before the occurrence of an L-signal. 
The unconditional autocorrelation is then given by
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider a 
The correlation between the jumps equals ρ .
Appendix C
This section describes the empirical methodology utilized for this study, and follows closely the notation in Dunham and Friesen (2007) . The seminal references in this area are Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard (2004) , Tauchen and Zhou (2006) and Anderson, Bollerslev and Diebold (2007) . Let p(t) denote the time-t logarithmic price of the asset. The continuoustime jump diffusion process is expressed as a stochastic differential equation: In the absence of jumps, the second term on the right-hand-side is zero, and the quadratic variation equals the integrated (continuous) volatility.
Let the discretely sampled Δ-period returns be denoted by ) ( ) ( , For notational simplicity and without loss of generality, 1/Δ is assumed to be an integer. Then, as shown by Andersen and Bollerslev (1998) , by the theory of quadratic variation the realized volatility converges uniformly in probability to the increment in the quadratic variation process Thus, the contribution to the quadratic variation process due to discontinuities (i.e., jumps) can be consistently estimated by:
This is the fundamental insight upon which the estimation of the jump processes in this research is based.
Following Tauchen and Zhou (2006) we define the ratio statistic 
Figure 4
The head-and-shoulders pattern Figure 4 provides a schematic illustration of a price series displaying the "head-and-shoulders" pattern. The "inverse head-and-shoulders" pattern is simply the pattern in Figure 4 viewed upside down.
Figure 5
The double top pattern DOUBLE TOP Figure 5 illustrates the "double top" pattern. The pattern is identified by the appearance of two local maxima of approximately equal value. As with head-and-shoulders, the double-top pattern is interpreted as a signal of future price decline. The "double bottom" is an inverted "double top", and signals a future rise in price. Table 1 reports cross-sectional summary statistics for the 99 component stocks in 99 firms in the individual equity sample. RV is the realized volatility measure and BV is the bi-power variation measure. Jumps are identified and magnitudes calculated according to the methodology described in Appendix C, using 5-minute returns over the 1999-2005 sample period. Jump returns are zero on all non-jump days, and the daily continuous return equals the total daily return minus the jump return. Total risk is calculated as the sample variance of daily returns, obtained from CRSP. Continuous and jump risk are defined as the sample variance of continuous and daily jump returns, respectively, using returns on all days in the sample period. Table 2 reports cross-sectional summary statistics for mean value of each variable for the 99 component stocks in the S&P 100 Index sample. Jumps days are identified, and jump magnitudes calculated, according to the methodology described in Appendix C, using 5-minute returns over the 1999-2005 sample period. Jump frequency is the fraction of days on which a jump occurs. Jump size is calculated as the square root of the difference between Realized Volatility and the Bi-Power Variation measure. Statistics for jump size, absolute jump size and jump variance are calculated for jump days only, and thus are characteristics of the jump distribution conditional on a jump occurring. Panel (a) includes all jumps. Panel (b) includes only jumps that occur on days of high realized volatility, defined to be days on which an asset's realized volatility is above that asset's median realized volatility calculated over the entire sample period. Table 3 reports correlations for sequential equity jumps at time t, t+1, t+2 and t+3. Panel (a) includes only days on where a jump occurs, and panel (b) includes only jumps that occur on days of high realized volatility, defined to be days on which an asset's realized volatility is above that asset's median realized volatility calculated over the entire sample period. *, **, and *** indicates where correlations are statistically different than zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel (a)
Table 4 Autocorrelations Between L-Frequency Jumps and Sequential Jumps
For each firm, significant jumps are sorted into deciles based on absolute jump size. Panel (a) reports crosssectional statistics on size-sorted jumps. Panel (b) reports correlations for L-frequency jumps and sequential equity jumps at time t, t+1, t+2 and t+3, where L-frequency jumps are identified as jumps in the largest two deciles. Panel (c) reports similar correlations, but identifies L-frequency jumps as those in the top decile only. *, **, and *** indicates where correlations are statistically different than zero at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Panel (a)
:
